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Abstract
Despite its unusual payout structure, the Canadian 6/49 Lotto©is one of the
few government sponsored lotteries that has the potential for a favorable strat-
egy we call “buying the pot.” By “buying the pot” we mean that a syndicate
buys each ticket in the lottery, ensuring that it holds a jackpot winner. We as-
sume that the other bettors independently buy small numbers of tickets. This
paper presents (1) a formula for the syndicate’s expected return, (2) conditions
under which buying the pot produces a significant positive expected return,
and (3) the implications of these findings for lottery design.
1 Introduction
Moffitt and Ziemba (2017) show that expected returns of 10%-25% can be
achieved under certain conditions from betting all the tickets in a lottery that
pays its entire jackpot in equal shares to winning ticket holders. For many large
government lotteries, this strategy of “buying the pot” is not feasible because
the logistical problems are insurmountable. In the California Powerball Lot-
tery©, for example, the number of ticket combinations is over 175, 000, 000
and the rules do not allow betting large numbers of combinations on single
paper tickets.
The Canadian 6/49 Lotto©, however, has a large but manageable number
of ticket combinations (13, 983, 816) and allows paper tickets that have multiple
combinations. The 6/49 is played in other countries, including the UK. Here
we focus on the Canadian version.
The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) to modify the pure jackpot model
in Moffitt and Ziemba (2017) to accomodate the irregular payout features of
the Canadian 6/49 Lotto, (2) to derive conditions under which the expected
return from buying the pot is positive, and (3) to discuss the implications of
our findings for lottery design.
2 Previous Work and Instances of Buying
the Pot
Each lottery has the following rules — players buy tickets and the winning
ticket is selected using an equiprobable drawing. Those who hold the winning
ticket share equally in a jackpot that consists of a carryover pot from the
previous lottery plus an after tax portion the monies wagered. If there is
no winner, the jackpot pool carries over to the next drawing. There can be
multiple carryovers.
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Moffitt and Ziemba (2017) use the following assumptions and notation to
analyze the pure jackpot model :
• Each lottery has t tickets costing $1 apiece.
• A single winning ticket w, 1 ď w ď t is drawn from i “ 1, . . . , t using
probabilities pi “ 1{t.
• The syndicate buys one of each ticket for a total of t tickets, and c individ-
uals (the “crowd”) independently buy one ticket apiece using probabilities
qi, 1 ď i ď t.
• A cash jackpot v “ a ` pt ` cqp1 ´ xq is awarded in equal shares to all
holders of the winning ticket w, where a ě 0 is the current carryover from
the previous lottery draws, c is the number of tickets bet by the crowd,
and x is the the (fractional) take.
Moffitt and Ziemba (2017) show the following for the pure jackpot model:
(1) Recursion: When t and c are large, qi “ 1{t for each i, and X is the
random number of winning tickets held by the crowd, the expected value
E
”
n
n`X
ı
, n an integer ě 1, is to close approximation equal to
E
„
n
n`X

“
$&%
1
λpcq
`
1´ e´λpcq˘ n “ 1
n
λpcq
!
1´ E
”
n´1
n´1`X
ı)
n ą 1, (1)
where λpcq “ c{t.
(2) Condition under which Buying the Pot has Positive Expected Return:
The expected gain for a syndicate that bets one of each ticket is positive
pa` pt` cqp1´ xqqE
„
1
1`X

´ t ą 0 (2)
provided that a{pt` cq ´ x ě 0. Since a{pt` cq ´ x is the after tax value
of a ticket assuming the pot a is fairly split, this condition implies that
a syndicate earns more than a fair split of the jackpot. In a lottery with
no take, the returns to the syndicate typically range between 10% and
25%.
(3) Optimal Strategies:
(a) The best returning strategy for the crowd consists of using qi “ 1{t
for each i.
(b) Let EqrX{p1 ` Xqs be the expectation for a crowd that bets with
probability vector q “ pq1, . . . , qtq1, and let 1t{t be the probability
t-vector that has 1{t for each entry. Then if q ‰ 1t{t
EqrX{p1`Xqs ă E1t{trX{p1`Xqs. (3)
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Several studies of lottery strategy and design have appeared in the eco-
nomic literature. Chernoff (1980, 1981) studied the Massachusetts Numbers
Game, proposing that playing unpopular numbers might be a winning strategy.
However, the results from a test were disappointing because of learning (un-
popular numbers became less unpopular) and gambler’s ruin (betting funds
were exhausted). Ziemba et al. (1986) carry this further and study various
Canadian lotto games, their unpopular numbers and the uniformity of bet-
ting. Johnson and Klotz (1993) has additional discussion of this latter point
and Joe (1987), Stern and Cover (1989) and Ziemba (2008) further analyze un-
popular numbers. Thaler and Ziemba (1988) review the behavioral evidence
in efficient markets for a persistence of betting at unfavorable odds. MacLean
et al. (1992) investigate the use of Kelly optimal wagering on unpopular tickets
and find that this strategy has positive expectation, but the waiting time to
achieve reliable gains with high probability is millions of years! Clotfelter and
Cook (1990) discuss behavioral bases of betting and along with Walker (2008),
discuss design considerations for lotteries. None of these studies consider the
strategy that in a short time achieves reliable gains — buying the pot.
There are anecdotal accounts of successful buyings of the pot. One putative
attempt involved a syndicate that tried but failed to buy all tickets. But they
were lucky, having had time to bet only about 70% of all tickets according to
one source and 85% according to another (NYTimes (1992)). The syndicate
ostensibly bet about $5 million and won about $27 million.
There are examples of when it was optimal to buy the pot or betting was
advantageous. In June 1984 four western Canadian provinces jointly ran the
Lotto West 6/8/56, in which players choose six numbers from a field of 56, but
eight winning numbers and a bonus number are drawn. The jackpot is shared
among all tickets that select six of the eight drawn, second price among all that
had five of six, and other payouts to those having five of six plus the bonus,
four of six or three of six. These rules make the jackpot about twelve times
easier to hit than the 6/49 Lotto: 1 in 1, 159, 587 (See Ziemba et al. (1986)).
In 1987, the provinces went their own ways, at which time the BC Lotto
Corporation had about $10 million in unclaimed prize money. Rather than
donate it, they created a version of Lotto 6/8/56 to give it back on March
27, 1987. As before eight numbers were drawn from 56, but players could
now choose 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 numbers on a ticket. A schedule of payouts was
published for 1/1, 2/2, /3/3, 4/4, 5/5 and for 3/6, 4/6, 5/6 and 6/6. With
these payouts, the expected payback on a $1 ticket was $0.385. To promote the
game, the Corporation offered six tickets for the price of one, for an expected
return of $0.385 times 6, or $2.31, a 131% edge (Ziemba (1995)). Ziemba and
colleagues at the University of British Colombia knew that individual tickets
had a positive expected return, and in a makeshift effort, they bought about
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13,000 of the combinations. They made a nice return, but spent hours buying
and then locating the winning tickets. Some $3.5 million was paid out of the
unclaimed prize fund.
A game where it was optimal to buy the pot was the 5/40 Lotto played in
British Colombia and Rhode Island. Ninety-one percent of the net pool went
to 5/5 with a minimum shared pool of $150, 000 and maximum of $300, 000.
There were small prizes for 1+, 2+, 3, 4 and 4+ where “+” means getting
the sixth bonus number correct. There were 658, 008 combinations. But the
jackpot that had built up slowly fell because the public viewed it as unwinnable,
so it became a prime target for buying the pot; see Ziemba (1995).
3 Rules of the 6/49 Lotto
A ticket in the 6/49 Lotto is a unique choice of 6 different numbers from integers
1 to 49. Thus the total number of tickets is the number of combinations of 49
things taken 6 at a time:
t “
ˆ
49
6
˙
“ 49!
43!6!
“ 13, 983, 816. (4)
The Canadian 6/49 Lotto holds drawings twice a week and lumps together
the monies wagered for purposes of awarding prizes, whose allocation is de-
scribed below. On the drawing day, 6 numbers (the “winning numbers”) are
selected equiprobably and without replacement from 1, 2, . . . 49. Following
that, a 7th “bonus number” is selected.
We introduce notation to describe types of prize-wining tickets. A x/6-
ticket is one that contains exactly x of the six winning numbers but does
not contain the bonus number and a x/6+ ticket is one that contains exactly
x of the 6 numbers plus the bonus number. A x/6 ticket contains x of the
6 numbers, irrespective of the status of the bonus number; it is therefore a
union of types x/6- and x/6+. A 5/6-, for example, contains exactly 5 of the
6 winning numbers with the other not being the bonus number, and a 5/6+
ticket contains exactly 5 of the 6 winning numbers plus the bonus number. For
example, if the six numbers drawn were 46, 13, 4, 21, 38, 25 and the bonus
number was 43 then ticket 1-4-20-21-32-43 would be a 2/6+ ticket because
it contains 4 and 21 from the six plus the bonus number. Similarly, ticket
4-13-21-25-43-46 would be a 5/6+ ticket.
3.1 Rules for the Original Lottery: 1982-2004
Table 1 has the initial 6/49 payout scheme (1982-2004) for 3/6, 4/6, 5/6-,
5/6+ and the Jackpot 6/6. The cost of a single ticket was $1, with the lottery
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sponsors taking 55% of each daily betting pool and committing the remaining
45% (the “prize pool”) for player payouts. The 45% prize pool was allocated
as follows: all 3/6 tickets were paid $10, and the remainder was paid to holders
of 4/6, 5/6-, 5/6+ and 6/6 using percentage allocation rules in Table 1. That
game is analyzed thoroughly in Ziemba et al. (1986). See also Stern and Cover
(1989). For other analyses of such games, see Thaler and Ziemba (1988) and
Haigh (2008).
Table 1: Allocation of Prizes in the 6/49 Pools Fund: 1982-2004.
Prize Combinations Probability Allocation Rule Type
6{6 1 p1 „ 7.1e-08 50% of the Pools Fund Share
5{6` 6 p2 „ 4.3e-07 15% of the Pools Fund Share
5{6´ 252 p3 „ 1.8e-05 12% of the Pools Fund Share
4{6 13, 545 p4 “ 0.000969 23% of the Pools Fund Share
3{6 246, 820 p5 “ 0.017650 $10 per ticket Fixed
No Win 13, 723, 192 p8 “ 0.981362 Non-winner = $0 Returns 0
Figure 1 shows the leveraging effect of the fixed $10 3/6 prize when
there are average numbers, popular numbers, and unpopular numbers.
The impact of popular vs. unpopular numbers selected in the drawing is
significant, producing a 17% versus a 36% jackpot share. The large prizes
5/6-, 5/6+ and 6/6 for unpopular numbers in the drawing are typically
seven times larger than for popular ones. See examples in Ziemba et al.
(1986).
3.2 Rules for the Current Lottery: 9/18/2013 -
In the 6/49 Lotto, new rules were introduced in June, 2004 and again on
September 18, 2013. We discuss only the latter rules. These included (1)
a single ticket cost of $3, (2) three fixed prizes, the same 3/6 paying $10,
a 2/6+ paying $5 and a 2/6- that earns a free play at the next drawing,
and (3) altered payout percentages for 4/6, 5/6-, 5/6+ and 6/6 (Table 2),
(4) an increase in the take from 55% to 60%, and (5) a greater allocation
to 6/6 winners. The intention of these changes was to increase sales by
growing jackpots faster, and creating of many small consolation prices
(2/6-, 2/6+ and 3/6). This is a typical convex prize structure where
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Figure 1: Prize shares for 3/6, 4/6, 5/6, 5/6+ and 6/6 in the original 6/49 Lotto when the
drawing has Popular Numbers (), Unpopular Numbers (•) and Average Numbers (N).
For popular numbers, there is a large increase in the payouts for 3/6 tickets (ą 60%) at
the expense of other winning outcomes. Source: Ziemba et al. (1986).
most of the daily payout goes to the smallest (to make them feel that the
lottery is winnable) and to the largest (to show that a huge gain can be
made). Ziemba has used this in lottery consulting over the years. Shefrin
and Statman (1984) call this a “silver lining” for non-winners.
We call the number of tickets bet at a drawing (twice a week in the
6/49), the ticket pool, contributors to which are the crowd in amount c
and the syndicate in amount t. Thus the total number of tickets bet is
c` t. The betting pool d
BP
is the total number of dollars contributed by
the bettors. The betting pool is divided among the lottery sponsors and
the bettors as follows:
Sponsors. Sponsors (the state, the lottery organization) receive 0.60 ˚
d
BP
, with the remaining 0.40 ˚ d
BP
, the prize pool, awarded as prizes
or added to the carryover pool as indicated below. The “lottery
take” 0.60 ˚ d
BP
is used to cover expenses of running the lottery and
to provide funds for community and government services and for
donations. The lottery itself, however, is run by a non-governmental
company.
Prize Distribution. The prize pool has eight classes (i “ 1, 2, . . . , 8)
of payouts grouped into four types: (A) fixed dollar (2/6+ and
3/6), (B) free play in the next lottery (2/6-), (C) payouts that split
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among 4/6, 5/6-, 5/6+ and 6/6 tickets the remaining prize pool after
deductions for type (A) and (B) payouts, and (D) non-winner tickets
that receive no payout.
Table 2 details these payouts by showing in the first column the
type of ticket, in the second column a notation for the number of
each class determined after the random, equiprobable drawing of
6 numbers and a bonus, the third column showing the notation
for the class, the fourth column the number of tickets matching a
randomly drawn ticket, the fifth column having the probability that
a randomly chosen ticket is in the class, the sixth column having
the allocation rule and the last, whether the ticket payout is fixed,
shared as part of a pool, or returns nothing.
The 2/6+ and 3/6 tickets receive $5 and $10, respectively, and 2/6-
tickets receive a free play in the next lottery, but a charge of $1.41 is
applied to the prize pool. See Example 3.1 for details. The payouts
are shown in the first four lines of the table for 4/6, 5/6-, 5/6+ and
6/6 tickets. These type (C) tickets share the remainder of the 0.40 ˚
d
BP
after deductions for tickets of types (A) and (B). The amount
0.40˚d
BP
´ppayouts to 2/6+, 3/6 and charges for 2/6-q is called the
Pools Fund. Type (C) tickets share in a pool whose percentage of
the total bets varies greatly, depending on the winning numbers of
2/6+, 3/6 and free plays. The lottery also guarantees a $5,000,000
pool to holders of 6/6 tickets.
Table 2: Allocation of Prizes in the Current 6/49 Pools Fund.
# Crowd # Combinations Allocatio Share
Type Tickets Class for any ticket Probability Rule Status
(C) N1 6{6 1 p1 „ 7.1e-08 79.5% of the Pools Fund Share
(C) N2 5{6` 6 p2 „ 4.3e-07 6% of the Pools Fund Share
(C) N3 5{6´ 252 p3 „ 1.8e-05 5% of the Pools Fund Share
(C) N4 4{6 13, 545 p4 “ 0.000969 9.5% of the Pools Fund Share
(A) N5 3{6 246, 820 p5 “ 0.017650 $10 per ticket Fixed
(A) N6 2{6` 172, 200 p6 “ 0.012314 $5 per ticket Fixed
(B) N7 2{6´ 1, 678, 950 p7 “ 0.120064 free play ($1.41 deduction) Fixed
(D) N8 No Win 11, 872, 042 p8 “ 0.848984 Non-winner = $0 Returns 0
Any unclaimed monies in the Pools Fund are added to the current
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jackpot and carried over to the next drawing. From Table 2, it is
clear that the majority contribution to the carryover is the 79.5%
that occurs when there is no 6/6 winner. But 5/6+ and 5/6- tickets
also have low probabilities of occurring and when there are no 5/6+
or 5/6- winners, those shares of 6% and 5%, respectively, are added
to the carrover pool for the next lottery.
The probabilities of these tickets occurring in an equiprobable lot-
tery are denoted by p1, p2, etc. This notation is useful in the ana-
lytical expressions developed below.
Example 3.1 (Example of prize payouts under the current 9/8/2013
rules). The carryover is $30,000,000 and the crowd bets 10, 000, 000 tick-
ets, of which 1, 000, 000 are assumed to be free plays, yielding a net
cash contribution of $27, 000, 000. Assuming the crowd chooses quick
picks with probabilities of 1{t, numbers for each ticket will have a bino-
mial distribution. Random selections under the binomial are displayed
in column 3 of Table 3, which gives the probability of this class of ticket
winning. The first column is the winning ticket type, the second, the
number of combinations, the fourth the total payouts to the crowd, the
fifth the number of tickets held by the syndicate and the sixth, the total
payouts to the syndicate. Using these numbers, we calculate the prize
pool, the fixed payouts to crowd and syndicate, and the pools fund as
follows:
• Prize Pool: $27, 580, 579 “ 0.40 ˚ p13, 983, 816 ˚ 3 ` 0.90 ˚ 30, 000, 000q.
• Crowd Fixed: $4, 077, 490 “ 176, 933 ˚ $10` 123, 569 ˚ $5` 1, 198, 805 ˚ $1.41.
• Syndicate Fixed: $5, 696, 520 “ 246, 820 ˚ $10` 172, 200 ˚ $5` 1, 678, 950 ˚ $1.41.
• Pools Fund: $17, 806, 569 “ $27, 580, 579´ $4, 077, 490´ $5, 696, 520.
Table 3: Example of Payouts from a Sample 6/49 Pools Fund.
# Crowd Crowd # Syndicate Syndicate
Type Combinations Tickets Payout Tickets Payout
6{6 1 0 $0 1 $44,156,222
5{6` 6 6 $534,135 6 $534,135
5{6´ 252 185 $375,960 252 $514,534
4{6 13, 545 9,773 $708,909 13,545 $982,518
3{6 246, 820 176,933 $1,769,330 246,820 $2,468,200
2{6` 172, 200 123,569 $617,845 172,200 $861,000
2{6´ 1, 678, 950 1,198,805 $0 1,678,950 $0
8
Summing all payouts in the syndicate payout column gives $49,516,609,
for a gain of
$7, 565, 161 “ $49, 516, 609´ $3 ˚ 13, 983, 816.
plus 1,678,200 free plays in the next lottery. The cash payout from
non-6/6 tickets is $5,360,387, despite a crowd and syndicate bet of
$68,951,454. Clearly, the jackpot must be large in order for buying the
pot to be justifiable.
4 Expected Return from Buying the Pot
4.1 Notation and Terminology
Table 4 gives the fixed parameters of the lottery, namely those that do
not involve betting strategies of the syndicate or crowd.
Table 4: Fixed Parameters for the 6/49 Lotto.
Notation Description
t Number of tickets in the lottery = 13,983,816.
a Carryover pool in dollars, a ě 0.
pi Probability that a ticket is of class i assuming that
the winning ticket is drawn equiprobably (see Table 2).
f Fraction of tickets that are “free plays.”
c Number of tickets bet by the crowd.
Table 5 has the notation for the random variables that account for
stochasticity and strategy in playing the lottery.
Using the notation in Tables 4 and 5, the number of dollars in each
fund is
d
AB
“ 10pN5 ` tp5q ` 5pN6 ` tp6q ` 1.41pN7 ` tp7q (5)
d
BP
“ 3pt` cp1´ fqq (6)
d
PP
“ d
BP
0.4 (7)
d
PF
“ d
PP
´ d
AB
(8)
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Table 5: Random Variables for 6/49 Payouts.
Notation Description
Ni Random variable for the number of tickets of class i bet by
the crowd (see Table 2).
N Vector N “ pN1, N2, . . . , N8q1.
d
AB
Dollars awarded or deducted for tickets of types (A) and (B).
d
BP
Dollars in the betting pool.
d
PP
Dollars in the prize pool.
d
PF
Dollars in the Pools Fund.
Since f is non-random, the second entry of the above table is the only
non-stochastic entry.
4.2 Equiprobable Betting by the Crowd
We calculate first the expected return to a syndicate that buys the pot
when the crowd chooses tickets independently and equiprobably. As we
discuss in Section 4.3, this is the crowd’s optimal strategy, although they
do not employ it in practice — and the cost of this “mistake” is consid-
erable.
4.2.1 Syndicate’s Expected Value for Equiprobable Crowd
Betting
In Appendix A, we develop a formula for the syndicate’s expected gain
Gpcq from the wagering of $41, 951, 448 “ $3 ˚ 13, 983, 816 on 13, 983, 816
tickets:
ErGpcq s “ pa` 0.795 ˚ µpcqqλpcq´1p1´ expp´λpcqqq (9)
`
ˆ
0.06νpcq ` 0.145 1
1` c{t
˙
µpcq
` $3, 329, 200 ´ $3t,
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where
λpcq “ c{t,
µpcq “ 0.40 ¨ 3 ppt` c ¨ p1´ fqqq ´ pt` cq ¨ pp5$10 ` p6$5 ` p7$1.41q,
νpcq “ E
„
6
6`X5/6+

, for X „ Binpc, 6{tq.
The term νpcq is calculated using the recursive formula in Appendix A
and appears as the last column of Table 6.
4.2.2 Parameters that Lead to Positive Expected Return
Consider the implications of the 6/49 rules and of Formula (18). Be-
cause the lottery sponsors take such a high percentage of the betting
pool (60%), a large jackpot is needed for a syndicate to have a posi-
tive expected return. When a syndicate bets one of each ticket, previous
analysis showed the syndicate’s numbers of winning tickets are known ex-
actly, irrespective of the winning numbers from the drawing. There will
always be exactly 1 winning ticket, exactly 6 5/6+ tickets, exactly 252
5/6- tickets, and so on. The RHS of first line of formula (18) dominates
the others when a jackpot a is large.
Table 6 shows the results of applying formula (18) for 10 levels of
total crowd betting (c) to solve for the sizes of carryover pools (a) that
produce expected returns of 0%, 10% and 20% for the syndicate. Since
the cost of buying the pot is $3 ˚ 13, 983, 816 “ $41, 951, 448, a return of
10% is $4, 195, 145. When the crowd bets $30 million, for example, any
carryover larger than $36.92 million is a potential play for the syndicate,
and carryovers of $42.80 and $48.67 million have expected returns of 10%
and 20%, respectively. The last three columns of Table 6 provide insight
into the payout structure. The sixth column shows the expected amount
in the Pools Fund and the next column is its percentage in the prize pool.
Thus when the crowd bets $40 million, the expected Pools Fund is $19.97
million, which is 49.68% of the prize pool. Thus, the charges for fixed
payout tickets amount to $50.32% of the prize pool. The final column is
the expected value for the 5/6+ factor:
EV56+ “ E
„
6
6`X5/6+

. (10)
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Table 6: Carryover thresholds from buying the pot for breakeven, 10% and 20% returns as
a function of the size of the crowd’s total bet, assuming the f “ 10% of the crowd’s tickets
are free plays. The sixth column has the expected pools fund, the seventh, the expected
percentage of the pools fund to the prize pool and the last, the expected value of the 5/6+
factor of expression (10).
Crowd Crowd Carryover Thresholds Expected (Pools Fund) ÷ EV56+
Tickets $ Bet Breakeven +10% +20% Pools Fund (Prize Pool) Eqn. (10)
(millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (%) (%)
3.3 9 30.33 35.05 39.76 13.28 58.39 82.71
6.7 18 33.46 38.74 44.01 15.51 54.02 70.15
10.0 27 36.92 42.80 48.67 17.74 51.32 60.71
13.3 36 40.71 47.22 53.73 19.97 49.68 53.40
16.7 45 44.81 51.99 59.17 22.20 48.73 47.60
20.0 54 49.21 57.10 64.99 24.44 48.27 42.90
23.3 63 53.90 62.52 71.15 26.67 48.14 39.02
26.7 72 58.84 68.24 77.63 28.90 48.25 35.77
30.0 81 64.03 74.23 84.42 31.13 48.53 33.01
33.3 90 69.45 80.46 91.48 33.37 48.92 30.64
The expected value declines when the crowd bets more, as one expects
since X5/6+ is generally larger.
Recall from Example 3.1 that the crowd bet a net $27,000,000 on 10
million tickets and the carryover was $30,000,000 — yet the syndicate
won over $6 million. According to Table 6, the syndicate should not
bet under these conditions, since a minimum carryover of $36.92 million
is necessary. There is no problem here, since the numbers in the table
are expected values and it is quite possible for a syndicate to win despite
making an unfavorable bet. The syndicate in that example just got lucky.
4.3 Non-equiprobable Betting by the Crowd
The calculations in Section 4.2 assumed that the crowd bets indepen-
dently using q “ 1
t
1t, where 1t is a t-vector of all ones. What happens
when the crowd bets using q ‰ 1
t
1t?
In part 2.0(3), we stated a result from Moffitt and Ziemba (2017),
that for pure jackpot lotteries (ones having a single prize, a non-stochastic
12
jackpot1 v) the expected payoff is
Eq
„
v
1
1`N1

“ vEq
„
1
1`N1

ą vE1t{t
„
1
1`N1

“ E1t{t
„
v
1
1`N1

,
(11)
where q ‰ 1{t1t, N1 is the random number of 6/6 tickets held by the
crowd. However, formula (11) does not apply in the present case because
v is stochastic, depending on the size of the Pools Fund.
Consider a non-stochastic configuration of single ticket bets nj “
pnj1, nj2, . . . , njtq1 for individuals j “ 1, . . . , c, each having zeroes ex-
cept for a single 1 in some position. Define zk “ řj“cj“1 njk and t-vector
z “ pz1, . . . , ztq1. Clearly, řk“tk“1 zk “ c. To compute the expected values
of ticket types 1, 2, . . . 7 with respect to an equiprobable drawing, observe
that as i ranges over all ticket drawings i “ 1, . . . t, for any nj, the num-
ber of 6/6 is 1, the number of 5/6+ is 6, the number of 5/6 is 252, and so
on as indicated in Table 2. Since the drawing is equiprobable, dividing
each of these by t gives the probability that any non-stochastic ticket will
be of the indicated type under an equiprobable drawing. Define indicator
functions on single ticket t-vectors n as:
Ix{6pnq “
#
1 if ticket n is a x/6 ticket,
0 otherwise.
Applying this to fixed payout types 3/6, 2/6+ and 2/6, we obtain for d
AB
in formula (5)
EerdAB s “ Ee
«
j“cÿ
j“1
 
$10I3{6pnjq ` 5I2{6`pnjq ` 1.41I2{6
(ff` $5, 696, 520
“ `$10p3{6 ` $5 p2{6` ` $1.41p2{6˘ c ` $5, 696, 520,
“ $0.4073651 ¨ c ˚ ` $5, 696, 520. (12)
where the notation Ee emphasizes that the expectation is taken over
equiprobable drawings and $5, 696, 520 is the fixed payout/deduction for
the syndicate.2 The (stochastic) jackpot is v “ a ` 0.795d
PF
and the
1We are assuming that the crowd’s number of tickets, c, is known.
2$5, 696, 520 “ $10 ˚ 246, 820` $5 ˚ 172, 200` $1.41 ˚ 1, 678, 950.
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random 6/6 payout to the syndicate is
v
1
1`N1 “ pa ` 0.795dPF q
1
1`N1
“ pa ` 0.795p0.4p3pt ` cp1´ fqqq ´ d
AB
qq 1
1`N1
“ pa ` 0.954pt ` cp1´ fqqq 1
1`N1 ´
d
AB
1`N1
“ pa ` 0.954pt ` cp1´ fqq ´ $5, 696, 520q 1
1`N1´ (13)
$10N5 ` 5N6 ` 1.41N7
1`N1 (14)
In (13), the factor multiplying 1{p1`N1q is fixed. Its expectation using
(11) is
Eq
„
pa ` 0.954pt ` cp1´ fq ´ $5, 696, 520qq 1
1`N1

ą pa ` 0.954pt ` cp1´ fq ´ $5, 696, 520qq 1
λ
p1´ expp´λqq, (15)
where λ “ c{t. Thus for this term at least, the syndicate gets more than
a fair split of the jackpot since
1
λ
p1´ expp´λqq ą t
t` c.
The second term (14) depends on N1, N5, N6 and N7, which respec-
tively, are the numbers of 6/6, 3/6, 2/6+ and 2/6 tickets held by
the crowd, and these are dependent on the crowd betting probabilities
q “ pq1, . . . , qtq1. But we do not have the data to model the joint distri-
bution of pN1, N5, N6, N7q which is needed to evaluate (14).
However, we have circumstantial evidence that N5, N6 and N7 are
positively correlated with N1. Therefore we make a crude assumption
that the joint crowd payouts for 3/6, 2/6+ and 2/6 tickets are increased
linearly with the winning ticket, that is, the payout for ticket i is propor-
tional to qi:
$10N5 ` $5N6 ` $1.41N7
1`N1 ¨ qi{p1{tq.
Thus if the winning ticket i is bet with twice the frequency of an equiprob-
able bet, so that tqi “ 2, then the fixed payouts/deductions will be twice
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that expected in the equiprobable case (see the discussion leading to
equation (12)).
Using H “ $10p5 ` $5p6 ` $1.41p7, we calculate
E1t{t
„
min pcHtqi, dPF q 1
1`N1

ď E1t{t
„
cHtqi
1
1`N1

“ HtE1t{t
„
cqi
1
cqi
p1´ e´cqiq

“ Ht
i“tÿ
i“1
1
t
p1´ e´cqiq
ď Htp1´ e´c{tq (16)
“ cH
λ
p1´ e´λq, (17)
where λ “ c{t and the step (16) follows from Jensen’s inequality since
1 ´ e´cq is a concave function of q. Jensen’s inequality can be stated
as follows. A function f : ra, bs Ñ R that satisfies fpta ` p1 ´ tqbq ď
tfpaq ` p1´ tqfpbq for all t P p0, 1q is called convex, and if the inequality
is strict, strictly convex. For a random variable X and convex function
f , Jensen’s inequality asserts that fpErXsq ď ErfpXqs. Further, if X
is not degenerate and f is strictly convex, then fpErXsq ă ErfpXqs. A
function f is (strictly) concave if ´f is (strictly) convex i, so Jensen’s
inequality is reversed for concave functions.
Putting (15) together with (17) yields
E
„
v
1
1`N1

ě pa ` 0.954pt ` cp1´ fqq ´ $5, 696, 520 ´ cHq
¨ 1
λ
p1´ e´λq (18)
where λ “ c{t and H “ $10p5 ` $5p6 ` $1.41p7.
This calculation shows that the syndicate obtains a better result than
when the crowd bets proportionally, as in the corresponding result for
pure jackpot lotteries.
5 Design Considerations for Lotteries
Lottery design includes the goal to maximize the the sponsors’ earn-
ings. Assuming fairly constant fixed costs of running the lottery, sponsors
15
should strive to make the lottery popular, thereby increasing profitability.
The most recent changes to payouts were made with that goal in mind —
these changes increased the “convexity” of payouts, meaning many little
prizes and greater jackpot growth. Ziemba recommended these designs in
his work in the 1980’s and Walker (2008) later also recommended them.
Convex designs encourage players because more “get something back,”
while at the same time growing large jackpots quickly.
This design is supported by research in behavioral finance. Lopes’
SP/A (Security-Potential/Aspiration) model (Lopes (1987)), an im-
proved version of the classic Friedman/Savage (1948) utility curves, ar-
gues that many unsophisticated gamblers prefer strategies of buying safe
prospects with a few longshots (the “Cautiously Hopeful” pattern of
SP/A). Regarding large jackpots, Daniel Kahneman has written
“For emotionally significant events, the size of the probability sim-
ply doesn’t matter. What matters is the possibility of winning.
People are excited by the image in their mind. The excitement
grows with the size of the prize, but it doesn’t diminish with the
size of the probability.” Source: Bernard (2013).
There is another aspect of lottery design, namely, discouraging syndi-
cates from buying the pot. There are two ways to accomplish this: (1)
creating a large number of tickets making it logistically difficult to buy
the pot, and (2) using convex designs, which reduces the likelihood that
pot buying situations will occur. Method (1) is not feasible except for
large lotteries like the California Powerball lottery. The reason is that if
the number of tickets sold are too small relative to the total number of
tickets, the jackpot may build slowly and seldom be won. On the other
hand, method (2) can be effective regardless of the size of the lottery. To
illustrate, consider a pure jackpot lottery with the same carryover, take
and crowd betting as in Table 6. The results are shown in Table 7. The
first column has the number of tickets, which after a 10% deduction for
free plays, equals the crowd contribution to the betting pool shown in the
second column. Then assuming a take of 60%, breakeven thresholds of
0%, 10% and 20% for the pure jackpot lottery are shown in columns 3-5
and for the 6/49 in columns 6-8. The results show that buying the pot
thresholds are lower in the pure lottery, but not as much as might be
expected.
But one can see the reason by a simple argument. When the sponsors
takes 60%, only 40 cents is returned as prizes for each dollar wagered.
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Therefore, a syndicate needs to recover 60% of the covering bet, or 0.6 ˚
$3 ˚ 13, 983, 816 “ $25, 170, 869, regardless of the lottery’s rules. As we
have shown, the syndicate earns its fair share of consolation prizes, but
the free plays it earns are not worth too much since after the lottery is
hit the next lottery when those tickets will be used will have a small
purse. Assuming the the crowd bets $1, 000, 000 on the next lottery the
expected value of these 1, 678, 950 tickets will under optimal wagering be
worth about $150, 000.
Table 7: Carryover thresholds for a pure jackpot lottery and the 6/49 Lotto.
Crowd Crowd Carryover Thresholds for Pure Jackpot Carryover Thresholds for 6/49 Lotto
Tickets $ Bet Breakeven +10% +20% Breakeven +10% +20%
(millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions)
3.3 9 26.77 31.48 36.20 30.33 35.05 39.76
6.7 18 28.76 34.04 39.31 33.46 38.74 44.01
10.0 27 31.14 37.02 42.89 36.92 42.80 48.67
13.3 36 33.90 40.41 46.92 40.71 47.22 53.73
16.7 45 37.02 44.20 51.38 44.81 51.99 59.17
20.0 54 40.49 48.38 56.26 49.21 57.10 64.99
23.3 63 44.28 52.91 61.53 53.90 62.52 71.15
26.7 72 48.37 57.77 67.17 58.84 68.24 77.63
30.0 81 52.75 62.94 73.13 64.03 74.23 84.42
33.3 90 57.38 68.39 79.41 69.45 80.46 91.48
We conclude the discussion by examining the impacts of design choices
in the 6/49 Lotto. The 6/49 Lotto’s convex design according to Table 7
raised the bar for buying-the-pot strategies, making carryover thresholds
roughly 12% to 20% higher. We now compare the impacts of the 6/49’s
design features toward increasing the threshold for buying the pot. We
identify four factors: (1) the take, (2) the payouts for small prizes, (3) the
payouts for large, non 6/6 prizes, and (4) free plays. Then we compare
by
1. Changing the take only, using alternatives 55%, 60% (current) and
65%.
2. Eliminating fixed payouts 3/6 and 2/6+ only.
3. Eliminating 4/6, 5/6 and 5/6+ payouts only.
4. Eliminating free plays only.
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Table 8 shows breakeven carryover thresholds for these design factors.
The factor is indicated in the first column and the other 5 columns are
carryover thresholds when the crowd bets the indicated millions of dol-
lars, 20, 40, etc. In the second column (corresponding to a crowd bet
of $20 million), the numbers in parenthesis are differences of threshold
carryovers from the current 6/49 values (second row, second column).
Since the relative impacts of these factors are the same for the five crowd
betting amounts, their impacts on the buying the pot strategy can be
assessed using this column. The greatest factor impact is due to free
plays; removing them drops the threshold by $3.39 million („ 10%). The
largest inhibitor is clearly the take — increasing it by 0.05% from to 65%
has a large impact on breakeven carryovers.
Table 8: Breakeven Carryover Thresholds for Various 6/49 Design Factors.
Crowd Bets in Millions of Dollars
Design 20 40 60 80 100
Factor million million million million million
TAKE=0.55 30.56 (-2.90) 36.98 44.64 53.41 63.15
CURRENT 6/49 33.46 ( 0.00) 40.71 49.21 58.84 69.45
TAKE=0.65 36.37 ( 2.91) 44.44 53.79 64.27 75.74
NO 2/6+, 3/6 32.88 (-0.58) 39.65 47.76 57.08 67.44
NO 4/6, 5/6 32.99 (-0.47) 39.87 48.07 57.48 67.91
NO FREE PLAY 30.07 (-3.39) 36.28 43.73 52.29 61.81
Based on these statistics, we make recommendations for state lotter-
ies using ratings of the form p` “ ´ ˘ ¯,` “ ´ ˘ ¯q. The first sign
is for popularity, the second for inhibiting buyers of the pot. For exam-
ple, p`,´q indicates that a factor increases the lottery’s popularity, but
encourages buying the pot.
1. p¯,`q If possible, add combinations to the lottery by increasing the
numbers.
2. p`,`q Initiate a free play feature.
3. p¯,`q Increase the take.
4. p`,“q Offer many small prizes.
5. p`,“q Increase the allocation of the Pools Fund to 6/6 winners.
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6. p“,`q Decrease the awards to hard-to-win non 6/6 tickets.
Increasing the allocation to 6/6 allows quicker build-up of jackpots, which
encourages greater crowd participation. However, we did not address the
question of build-up speed of the jackpot, nor the acceleration of betting
on larger jackpots. These need to be studied in order to design prizes
and allocations to optimize betting flows.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown conditions under which buying the pot in the
6/49 Lotto has positive expected return when the crowd bets equiprob-
ably. We also indicated that equiprobable betting is optimal for the
crowd, that is, expected return is lower when it does not bet equiprob-
ably. We illustrated the advantages of lotteries with convex designs by
calculating 6/49 carryover thresholds and comparable pure jackpot carry-
over thresholds. We then rated various design features for their likelihood
of increasing a lottery’s popular, and decreasing the likelihood of buyers
of the pot.
Appendix A The Syndicate’s Expected Value
when the Crowd bets Equiprobably
Assuming that the lottery’s tickets are equiprobable, pN1, . . . N8q1 has a
multinomial distribution
pN1, . . . N8q1 „Multinpc` t, pq, (19)
where p “ pp1, p2, . . . , p8q1. The distribution of deductions dAB from the
prize pool is given by
d
AB
“ β1
AB
N, (20)
where β
AB
“ p0, 0, 0, 0, 10, 5, 1.41, 0q1 and N „Multinpc` t, pq.
Substituting (6) and (7) into equation (8) gives the Pools Fund as
d
PF
“ 0.40 ¨ 3 ¨ pt` c ¨ p1´ fqq ´ d
AB
. (21)
and in RHS of this expression, only d
AB
is random.
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Using results from Moffitt and Ziemba (2017), the expected value G
of the syndicate’s net gain, given d
PF
, as
ErGpcq | d
PF
s “ 0.795 ¨ pa` d
PF
qE
„
1
1`X6/6

(22)
` 0.06 ¨ d
PF
E
„
6
6`X5/6+

(23)
` 0.05 ¨ d
PF
E
„
252
252`X5/6-

(24)
` 0.095 ¨ d
PF
E
„
13545
13545`X4/6

(25)
` $2, 468, 200 ` $86, 100 ´ $3t (26)
where
pX6/6, X5/6+, X5/6-, X4/6q1 „Multinpc, p1, 6, 252, 13545q1{tq.
Since buying one of each ticket gives the same exact payout regardless of
the winning ticket (numbers of tickets shown in Table 2), we know that a
covering strategy pays $2,468,200 and $86,100, respectively, for 3/6 and
and 2/6+ tickets. This explains the term (26).
Using the formulas from (1) we obtain for λpcq “ c{t
E
„
1
1`X6/6

“ λpcq´1p1´ expp´λpcqqq (27)
and values νpcq “ E
”
6
6`X5/6+
ı
using recursion. These calculations take
care of terms (22) and (23).
Using the Law of Large Numbers, the expectation in the term (24)
can be approximated by
252
252 ` 252c{t “
1
1` c{t . (28)
and in term (25) by
13545
13545 ` 13545c{t “
1
1` c{t . (29)
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Basically, these two approximations amount to fair split of the corre-
sponding share of the Funds Pool. Thus
ErGpcq | d
PF
s “ pa` 0.795 ¨ d
PF
qλpcq´1p1´ expp´λpcqqq (30)
` 0.06 ¨ d
PF
E
„
6
6`X5/6+

(31)
` 0.145 ¨ d
PF
1
1` c{t (32)
` 2, 468, 200 ` 86, 100 ´ $3t (33)
where λpcq “ c{t. To complete the calculation, we need to eliminate
the dependence of ErGpcq | d
PF
s on d
PF
by determining its distribution
and performing an integration. But this is straightforward: the first
three terms (30), (31) and (32) are linear in d
PF
so that the expectation
µpcq “ Erd
PF
s should be substituted for d
PF
. The expectation Erd
PF
scan
be calculated by substituting (6) into (7) and (7) into (8) taking expec-
tations:
µpcq “ Erd
PF
s “ 0.40 ¨ 3 ¨ pt` c ¨ p1´ fqq ´ Erd
AB
s
We calculate Erd
AB
s as follows. For any ticket i, the number of tickets that
are 3/6, 2/6+ and 2/6- are respectively 248, 820, 172, 200, and 1, 678, 950,
respectively. Therefore, the probability that ticket i is a 3/6, 2/6+ or
2/6- ticket, given that a winning ticket is drawn equiprobably, is p5 “
248, 820{t, p6 “ 172, 200{t and p7 “ 1, 678, 950{t, respectively. Now
consider any choice of c tickets. By linearity of expectations, the expected
number of 3/6 tickets is c ˚ p5, of 2/6+ tickets is c ˚ p6 and of 2/6- tickets,
c ˚ p7. Therefore,
νpcq “ Erd
AB
s “ pt` cqpp5 ˚ $10` p6 ˚ $5` p7 ˚ $1.41q.
Summarizing, the expected gain Gpcq to a syndicate that covers the
pool is
ErGpcq s “ pa` 0.795 ¨ µpcqqλpcq´1p1´ expp´λpcqqq (34)
`
ˆ
0.06νpcq ` 0.145 1
1` c{t
˙
µpcq
` $2, 553, 300 ´ $3t,
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where
λpcq “ c{t,
µpcq “ 0.40 ¨ 3 ppt` c ¨ p1´ fqqq ´ pt` cq ¨ pp5$10 ` p6$5 ` p7$1.41q,
νpcq “ E
„
6
6`X5/6+

, for X „ Binpc, 6{tq.
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